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Abstract
Why are some countries mired in poverty and ill health? Can policy facilitate their tran-
sition to sustained growth and better living standards? We offer answers using a dynamic
model of disease and development. Endogenous transmission of infectious disease gener-
ates non-ergodic growth where income alone cannot push a country out of a low-growth
development trap. Policy interventions, for example external aid, can successfully accel-
erate growth only when directed towards improving health and eliminating the burden of
infectious disease. Prioritizing improvements to adult mortality over morbidity is better for
development.
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1 Introduction
Health and income are each elemental to welfare but it is perhaps their joint relationship that
hasmost intrigued researchers. Countries that are poor in per capita income are also likely to be
poor in health. This high positive correlation between income andhealth iswell documented by
demographers, economists and epidemiologists (Soares, 2007). Sub-Saharan Africa’s prolonged
stagnation and overwhelming disease burden is a case in point.
Does better health facilitate economic development? Or is it development that drives health
improvements? While there is consensus that the relationship runs both ways, it is unclear if
one direction dominates. It also raises important policy questions regarding the type of for-
eign aid that the donor community should provide to developing countries – income-based or
health-specific – a question that is the focus of this study.
We adopt a dynamic general equilibriummodel of infectious disease and endogenous growth
fromChakraborty, Papageorgiou andPérez Sebastián (2010) (henceforthCPP). Themodel yields
an empirically relevant development trap; it is especially applicable to sub-Saharan Africa, host
to a wide range of infectious diseases. Income deficiency is not the cause of poor health in this
equilibrium. Hence marked health improvements can occur only from exogenous improve-
ments in public health or medical innovations.
This property of the development trap opens the door for policy interventions. We show
that untied income aid has no growth effect but aid directed towards improving health can
propel an economy out of the low-growth equilibrium. The cost of such health aid is substantial
unless capital accumulation is simultaneously targeted. We also show that health innovations
that improve mortality are preferred to those that lower morbidity because the latter can have
perverse effects on incentives to engage in disease prevention.
Current levels of official health aid constitute only about six percent of overall aid. Our find-
ings suggest that the share of health aid should increase drastically to complement recent pri-
vate initiatives, theGates Foundation for example, in order to positively impact national income
and health.
Our theory sheds light on the “income versus public health” debate. On one side of the
debate, McKeown (1976) and notably Fogel (1997) have argued that nutrition played a vital role
in Britain’s mortality and economic transitions. On the other side, Preston (1996) and more
recently Cutler et al. (2006) and Soares (2007), propose that public health initiatives andmedical
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improvements, rather than income gains, caused the worldwide mortality declines of the past
century. The possibility of multiple growth trajectories indicates that the interaction between
health and income at the aggregate level is more nuanced, and depends on country-specific
characteristics.
Our findings also relate to the voluminous literature on aid and growth, from which two
papers are worth singling out. After correcting for the bias that aid typically goes to poorer
countries and to countries after poor performance, Rajan and Subramanian (2008) find little
robust evidence of a positive relationship between aid inflows and growth. Mishra and New-
house (2009) empirically estimate the effects of aid on infant mortality and find that although
overall foreign aid does not have a statistically significant effect on infant mortality, health aid
does. Our results are consistent with the findings of these two papers.
Finally, our policy analysis informs recentwork onpolitical factors influencing health. Specif-
ically, García-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2007) find that forced migration and social disrup-
tion due to civil wars are significant contributors to malaria incidence across the world. We
show that the cumulative economic cost of this interaction between conflict and health is size-
able.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and high-
lights forces driving the dynamics. Since themodel closely follows CPP, the presentation is kept
relatively brief. Section 3 discusses calibration and introduces different general equilibrium
possibilities that inform our policy analysis. Section 4 contains the main contribution of the
paper. It presents several policy experiments that culminate in our main recommendation for
the appropriate form of international aid. Section 5 concludes.
2 TheModel
Overlapping generations of families populate a discrete time, infinite horizon economy. Each
individual is born with a unit of labor and potentially lives for two periods: survival to the sec-
ond period depends on whether or not he contracts infectious disease early in life and prema-
turely dies from from it.
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2.1 Disease Transmission
Individuals work in youth and are retired in the second period. An infected (and infectious)
individual suffers a productivity loss of θ due to morbidity, supplying 1−θ units of efficiency
labor. He also enjoys a lower quality of life: a consumption bundle c delivers the utility flow
δu(c) instead of u(c), where δ ∈ (0,1). Finally, an infected young individual faces the risk of
dying before reaching old age.
All individuals start their youth being healthy. Subsequently some of them contract infec-
tious diseases, susceptibility to which depends on prevention and disease prevalence. Preven-
tion takes the form of expenditures, xt , early in youth that are privately costly. This encom-
passes a variety of health inputs like food nutrients, medicine andmedical care. More generally
prevention also involves costly behavior such as better hygiene, abstention from risky behavior
and occupational choices. Prevention is chosen ex ante, before a susceptible young individual
meets an infected older person.
Diseases spread from infected older individuals to younger ones through a process of ran-
dommatching, not all of which result in transmission. Suppose that a susceptible young person
meets µ> 1 older individuals. Given his preventive health investment xt , the probability that a
young individual gets infected from an encounter with an infected old is π(xt ). We choose
π(x)= aq
q +x , a ∈ (0,1), a > 1/µ, q > 0, (1)
for which π￿ < 0, π(0) = a and π(∞) = 0. The parameter q can be interpreted as the quality of
national health institutions and medical technology, an improvement in which occurs through
a decrease in q . The parameter a is the probability of getting infected in the absence of preven-
tion; it depends on virus mutations and the genetic evolution of humans.
Let pt denote the probability of being infected for a typical young member of generation
t after the µ encounters. The probability that this person meets an infected old person and
contacts the disease is itπt , where it is the fraction of generation t − 1 who are infected. The
probability of not being infected by any of them is then [1− itπ(xt )]µ. Hence,
pt = 1− [1− itπ(xt )]µ. (2)
Appealing to the law of large numbers, this probability also provides the prevalence rate of the
disease at date t +1, that is
it+1 = pt .
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2.2 Preferences and Prevention
We next discuss how preferences and behavior depend on an individual’s health status. The
superscriptU (I ) on variables refers to decisions and outcomes for uninfected (infected) indi-
viduals.
An uninfected individual whose preventive behavior has successfully protected him from
infectious disease maximizes lifetime utility
u
￿
cU1t
￿+βu ￿cU2t+1￿ , β ∈ (0,1)
subject to the budget constraints
cU1t =wt −xt − zUt , cU2t+1 =Rt+1zUt ,
where w is the wage per efficiency unit of labor, z denotes savings and x is given by decisions
made early in period t .
An infected individual, facing the constant probability 1−φ ∈ [0,1] of dying from infectious
disease in old-age, maximizes expected lifetime utility
δ
￿
u
￿
cI1t
￿+βφu ￿cI2t+1￿￿
subject to
cI1t = (1−θ)wt −xt − zIt , cI2t+1 =Rt+1zIt +τt+1,
where τt+1 denotes lump-sum transfers received from the government and utility from death
has been normalized to zero. The government collects the assets of the prematurely deceased
and distributes them among surviving infected individuals. In equilibrium, these transfers per
surviving infected individual will be
τt+1 =
￿
1−φ
φ
￿
Rt+1zIt . (3)
For the utility function, we choose the standard CES
u(c)= c
1−σ−1
1−σ , σ≥ 0. (4)
This takes on negative values for consumption levels less than one. We ensure that consump-
tion exceeds one, and hence survival is always desirable, through appropriate assumptions on
the aggregate technology below.
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The solution to the optimization problems provide the following saving decisions:
zUt = sU (wt −xt ), with sU ≡
￿
β1/σR1/σ−1
1+β1/σR1/σ−1
￿
, and (5)
zIt = sI [(1−θ)wt −xt ], with sI ≡
￿
φ(βφ)1/σR1/σ−1
1+φ(βφ)1/σR1/σ−1
￿
, (6)
conditioned on x. The impact of disease on development partly follows from zUt > zIt . The
infected save less since their effective discount rate is lower (φ< 1) and they are less productive
(θ > 0). The third type of cost, a lower utility flow (δ < 1), affects saving indirectly through
preventive investment.
Optimal saving, substituted into lifetimeutility, gives the two indirect utility functionsVU (xt )
and V I (xt ) contingent on prices, preventive health choices and disease realizations. Knowing
that, at the beginning of period t , individuals choose xt to maximize expected lifetime utility
ptV
I (xt )+
￿
1−pt
￿
VU (xt ). (7)
If the marginal cost from health investment exceeds the marginal benefit at xt = 0, then zero
prevention is an optimal choice. As shown below, this occurs when the disease externality is
high or when the threat of infection is quite low.
2.3 Production Technology
Define Lt = 1− θpt as the aggregate efficiency labor supply at time t , and kt = Kt/Lt as the
capital stock (K ) per effective unit of labor. A continuum of firms, indexed by i , operate in
perfectly competitive markets to produce the final good using capital and labor. For firm i , the
production function is:
F (K i ,Li )= A(K i )α(kLi )1−α+bLi , (8)
where A is a constant productivity parameter, k¯ denotes the average capital intensity across
firms, and it augments labor productivity through a learning-by-doing externality. The additive
component bLi , with b > 0, can be interpreted as a pre-industrial technology that utilizes only
labor and natural resources. It ensures a positive capital stock in all possible steady-states and,
for a sufficiently high value of b, that consumption levels exceed one.
Standard factor pricing relationships under such externalities imply that the wage per ef-
fective unit of labor (wt ) and interest factor (Rt ) are wt = (1−α)Akt +b, and Rt = αA ≡ R,
respectively.
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2.4 EquilibriumDynamics
Equation (2) holds the key to this economy’s dynamic behavior. Embedded in it is a negative
externality that is intrinsic to the transmission of infectious disease. The strength of this exter-
nality rises rapidly with prevalence; when prevalence is sufficiently large the marginal benefit
fromprevention becomes too low to justify its costs and the disease rapidly spreads to the entire
population.
Non-ergodicity, that is path dependent growth outcomes, follow from this disease dynam-
ics. When two stable stationary equilibria exist, everybody is infected in the absence of any
prevention in the first one and economic growth is low. Along the other growth path, a fully
healthy population enjoys rapid improvements in living standards.
More specifically, the solution to the maximization problem (7) defines optimal prevention
as a function of the capital stock and disease prevalence, xt = x(kt , it ). The possibility of two
local attractors depends on whether or not this prevention level is positive. Optimal health
investment is zero as long as its utility cost dominates, which occurs at relatively low levels
of income and very high or very low prevalence rates. When people do engage in prevention,
the level of that investment depends on the capital stock and disease prevalence in predictable
ways, that is, ∂x/∂k > 0 and ∂x/∂i > 0.
Using optimal health investment x(kt , it ), the equilibrium probability of getting infected
can be written as pt = p (x(kt , it ), it ) ≡ p(kt , it ). For sensible numerical values assigned to the
parameters, ∂pt/∂kt < 0 and ∂pt/∂it > 0. The former result is simply an income effect oper-
ating through preventive investment. The latter (∂pt/∂it > 0) is determined by two opposing
effects: disease prevalence directly increases the probability through the matching process but
also tends to lower it by encouraging preventive investment. This indirect effect is not suffi-
ciently strong to overturn the externality effect.
Two difference equations fully characterize the global dynamics given the initial conditions
(k0, i0). To get the first one, observe that aggregate saving is St = pt zIt + (1−pt )zUt and the asset
market clears when Kt+1 = St . Substituting for equilibrium disease transmission and dynamics,
this asset market clearing condition leads to
kt+1 = p(kt , it )z
I (kt , it )+ [1−p(kt , it )]zU (kt , it )
1−θp ￿p(kt , it )￿ . (9)
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The equilibrium evolution of the prevalence rate follows
it+1 = p(kt , it ). (10)
The dynamic systemcomprising equations (9) and (10) can entertain two stationary equilib-
ria whose properties were mentioned above. It is easy to obtain these two growth rates. Define
γ as the asymptotic growth rate of the economy’s capital stock per effective unit of labor. When
it = 0, the economy-wide saving propensity is sU and equation (9) implies
1+γH ≡ (1−α)AsU = β
1+β (1−α)A. (11)
Under full prevalence, in contrast, everyone suffers from ill health and the economy-wide sav-
ing rate is sI . In this case, long-run growth is
1+γL ≡ (1−α)AsI = βφ
2
1+βφ2 (1−α)A. (12)
This growth rate is zero if (1−α)AsI ≤ 1 and positive otherwise. Differences in the growth rates
in these two stationary equilibria depend on themortality cost of infectious disease alone (since
φ< 1). Morbidity factors, namely productivity loss and the quality-of-life effect, matter only for
convergence to these stationary equilibria via their effect on the level of saving.
3 Quantitative Analysis
We rely on quantitative methods to study the global dynamics behind equations (9) and (10).
This is necessitated by the nonlinearity of the dynamic system but has the virtue of providing a
tight structure to our subsequent policy analysis.
3.1 Calibration
Parameters are calibrated using aggregates so that we can suitably capture complementarities
among various infectious diseases that simultaneously afflict a country. For example, people
infected with one disease become more susceptible to other ones, like HIV/AIDS co-infection
with tuberculosis and malaria (Abu-Raddad et al 2006), or malaria co-infection with anemia.
The consequence of these complementarities is that losses for the economy due to mortality
andmorbidity are higher than the average loss across illnesses (Dow et al. 1999). Table 1 reports
the assigned benchmark values.
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Table 1: Benchmark Parameter Values
β 0.99(31.5×4) α 0.67 θ 0.15 µ 5
σ 1 γH 0.018 φ 0.47 q 0.14
b 1 A 24.19 δ 0.9 a 1
The model features overlapping generations of agents who potentially live for two periods.
To choose the length of one period, we use data on U.S. life expectancy at age 15 (LE15) which
was 63 in 2000 according to the World Health Statistics 2008. This implies 31.5 years for each
period or generation. Accordingly the discount factor (β) is calibrated to 0.9931.5×4, 0.99 being
the “standard” value per quarter.
We take preferences to be logarithmic (σ= 1). Three parameters need to be calibrated for the
aggregate production function: the total factor productivity (TFP) term A, the output elasticity
of capital α, and the pre-industrial technology parameter b. We normalize b = 1 to ensure that
consumption levels are bounded above one for reasons discussed before. We interpret capital
broadly (physical, human, organizational) to set α = 0.67. The value for A is chosen such that
the growth rate is 1.8% in the zero-prevalence steady state. This growth rate corresponds to
OECD’s average growth rate of GDP per capita during 1990−2003 (UNDP 2005). In other words,
A is chosen such that (1−α)sU A = 1.01831.5, which implies A = 24.19.
Parameters governing disease transmission are critical to quantifying the effort needed to
battle disease prevalence and transmission. To assign values to a, µ and q we take into account
the minimum annual expenditure that the World Health Organization estimates is needed to
fight diseases in least-developed countries.
More concretely, we set a = 1 as the benchmark and select pairs of µ and q that allow a
country to escape the development trap if preventive investment represents at least 7.2% of its
GDP. This percentage comes from dividing 34 by 475. The amount 34 (current US$) is WHO’s
(2001a) estimated minimum health expenditure, and 475 (current US$) is sub-Saharan Africa’s
average GDP per capita in 2001 (UNDP 2003). For each value of µ, the procedure provides a
value for q . We performpolicy experiments with three pairs of values: (µ,q) ∈ {(2,0.55), (5,0.14),
(10,0.06)}. Since we get similar results in each case, we report results only for the intermediate
case, µ= 5 and q = 0.14.
Estimates of the quality-of-life impact come fromdisability weights in the Burden ofDisease
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Project. A disability weight for a specific disease is a scaling factor that ranges from zero (fully
healthy) to one (worst possible health state). It is derived from patient surveys on subjective
valuations of disease impact. Disability weights vary across infectious illnesses. For example, it
equals 0.0 for the chagas disease, 0.1 for diarrheal episodes, and 0.5 for AIDS according toWHO
(2008). We choose a conservative value of 0.1 for the per-unit utility decline and assign the value
0.9 to δ.
In order to obtain an estimate of the income loss due to morbidity, we look at Dasgupta
(1993). He finds that workers (in particular, farm workers) that are too ill to work in developing
countries lose about 15 to 20 days of work each year, and when they are at work, productivity
may be severely constrained by a combination of malnutrition and parasitic and other infec-
tious diseases. His estimates suggest that potential income loss due to illness for poor nations
are of the order of 15%. This is the value assigned to θ.
Finally we calibrate the survival parameter φ. According to WHO (2001b), fatalities from
infectious diseases represent 53% of all deaths in Africa in 2001 for the adult male population
aged 15 and over. We require that themodel reproduce this number assuming that sub-Saharan
Africa is in a growth trap. Since the entire population suffers from ill health in this steady state,
the probability of death from infectious disease has to be 0.53. Henceφ= 0.47 is our benchmark
value.
3.2 Phase Portraits
The effect of policies depends on initial conditions and the forces that drive dynamics. The
model generates three types of scenarios with different stationary equilibria. Two of them dis-
play multiplicity, the third one uniqueness. We discuss each case using a phase portrait.
3.2.1 The benchmark case
Figure 1 displays the phase diagram for the parameter values in Table 1. It plots the prevalence
rate it against capital per effective unit of labor kt .
The x(kt , it ) = 0 line represents combinations of (kt , it ) for which the optimal decision is
not to invest in prevention. For low levels of disease prevalence (it → 0), the risk of catching an
infection is so low that prevention is not necessary. At high levels of disease prevalence (it → 1),
in contrast, the productivity of prevention becomes vanishingly small as the disease externality
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from sequential matching outweighs the benefits from prevention.
The ∆kt = 0 locus in Figure 1 is obained by imposing kt+1 = kt on equation (9). Capital
per effective unit of labor declines above this locus and increases below. The ∆kt = 0 line co-
incides with the x(kt , it ) = 0 curve to the right of point E . The parabolic shape of the ∆kt = 0
locus implies that the same prevalence rate can be associated with both high and low levels of
capital per effective worker. Two effects underlie this relationship. The prevalence of infectious
disease has a negative effect on capital accumulation, the numerator on the right-hand side of
equation (9), through premature mortality and labor productivity. An opposing effect comes
from the positive effect morbidity has on capital intensity that raises the efficiency wage rate
(denominator on the right-hand side of equation 9).
Turn next to the third locus given by the downward sloping line,￿it = 0, defined by
it = p(kt , it ) (13)
along which prevalence remains constant. The locus is defined wherever xt > 0 and, in this
area, prevalence is always decreasing above the locus, increasing below it. When prevention is
zero, on the other hand, the prevalence rate is always increasing since µa > 1.
There are two poverty traps with zero growth in Figure 1, PT and UPT , and a balanced
growth path BGP with positive growth. The PT steady-state is a sink while UPT is a saddle-
point. Given both initial conditions i0 and k0, PT is asymptotically stable but UPT is not.
Sequences of (kt , it ) that do not start exactly on the saddle-arm SS converge either to PT or
diverge to the BGP along which infectious diseases are fully eradicated and the economy grows
at a healthy rate. Thus the saddle path defines a threshold over the state space.1
An unusual feature of the development trap dynamics is that if it is relatively high (above the
xt = 0 locus), the economy always ends up at PT regardless of kt . The implication is that even
a well-off economy can spiral towards the trap if disease prevalence were to sharply increase
from an epidemic shock (that subsequently becomes an endemic disease).
3.2.2 No-trap scenario
When the probability of contagion is sufficiently small, the BGP is the unique steady state. To
illustrate this, let us entertain values of a that are lower than 1. Recall that a positively affects
1More precisely the saddle path is the threshold until it meets the x = 0 locus, at which point, the continuation
of that locus becomes the effective threshold.
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the probability of being infected after µ matches and, in particular, equals the probability of
disease transmission in the absence of prevention. Hence as a falls, preventive investment be-
comes more efficient. When a falls sufficiently, diseases can be avoided at relatively low cost
and enough saving is generated at low incomes to maintain a growing capital stock.
For the benchmark parameterization, a PT exists for a ∈ (0.49,1) with a prevalence rate
smaller than one. The low-growth trap vanishes when a falls below 0.49. For such low val-
ues, the ∆kt = 0 schedule disappears from the phase plane and optimal preventive investment
is positive for all (k, i ) > (0.15,0.09). Hence, no trap exists and all economies converge to the
unique BGP irrespective of initial conditions (Figure 2).
3.2.3 Multiple balanced-growth paths
The third interesting possibility shows path dependence like the first, but allows for positive
growth in the development trap. This occurs when φ is relatively high. When the survival prob-
ability exceeds 0.72, the saving rate is always high enough to sustain output growth. Recall,
though, that the development trap in this economy is driven fundamentally by the disease ex-
ternality and that lack of income is not what dooms countries to it. Hence, despite positive
income growth, countries do not escape the problem of pervasive ill health. Growth, in this
case, does not lead to development.
Assigning a value φ= 0.73 implies that, in the growth trap, the long-run growth rate of out-
put per capita is 0.1%, the average growth for SSA during 1990− 2003 (UNDP 2005). Figure 3
shows that, as with a < 0.49, the∆kt = 0 schedule vanishes and positive growth occurs from any
point in the (k, i ) plane. The figure illustrates dynamics for two economies: both start with the
same level of physical capital but differ in their prevalence rates (15% and 20%, respectively).
The economy that starts with a prevalence rate of 15% experiences rising disease prevalence for
2 generations, after which diseases abate as the economy convergences to an annual growth
rate of 1.8%. The economy with an initial prevalence rate of 20% shows a continuous rise in
prevalence until everyone is infected. In the long-run, this economy does not invest in preven-
tion and output per capita grows at 0.1% per year.
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4 Policy Experiments
For a stagnant economy afflicted by infectious disease, can external subsidies take it out of the
development trap? What is the best strategy to achieve good health and high growth? What is
the cost of infection in terms of lost growth?
The calibration strategy we implemented ensures that the minimum amount of health aid,
as estimated by the WHO, successfully pushes the economy out of the trap. Having already
accounted for the first question, we tackle the other two policy questions in this section.
First we consider subsidies financed through international donations.2 Some of these sub-
sidies target health investment (xsub), whereas others come in the form of capital investment
(ksub). Then we study the impact of exogenous shocks related to medical technology and poli-
tics and examine their policy implications.
4.1 Subsidies
The impact of policy depends on the global dynamics. We conduct policy experiments for each
of the three scenarios discussed in section 3.2.
4.1.1 Escaping the poverty trap
Suppose that the country is located at PT . Figure 4 shows the dynamics induced by different
policy packages (xsub ,ksub). The label next to each line denotes the specific policy package
applied and theminimumnumber of generations for which it needs to be implemented to help
the economy escape underdevelopment.
An immediate consequence of the model’s dynamics is that no k subsidy alone can take
the economy to the BGP . For example, even if international donors were to provide a very
large amount of aid for physical capital accumulation ksub = 0.8 (26% of GDP at PT ) to each
generation, the economymoves to a higher income level at PT
￿
without any impact on disease
prevalence and its burden. Figure 4 also illustrates how funds like xsub = 0.20 that represent
a health investment below 7.2% of GDP, and are therefore insufficient to escape the trap, can
reduce the long-run prevalence rate but raise income levels only slightly, from PT to PT
￿￿
.
Escaping the trap is possible through health subsidies alone provided that they are large
enough. Given the method used to calibrate the disease transmission parameters, xsub = 0.22
2Qualitatively similar results are obtained if subsidies are financed domestically with lump-sum taxes.
Battling Infection, Fighting Stagnation 13
(7.2%ofGDP atPT ) is theminimum required to take the economy fromPT toBGP . This health
subsidy has to be provided for at least 9 generations, which represents a substantial cost. This
minimumwill be our benchmark to which we compare other policy scenarios.
Important scale economies are associated with xsub in that the number of subsidized gen-
erations required to escape the trap falls rapidly with the level of subsidies. For instance, if we
double preventive subsidies (i.e., xsub = 0.44), it has to be provided for only 3 generations in-
stead of 9. When xsub = 0.8 this number falls to 1. This means that the most efficient health
investment strategy is a massive attack against infectious diseases, in other words eradication.
In present value terms, assuming a real interest rate of 3%, the package xsub = 0.8 supplied for
one generation costs 0.52, approximately double that the benchmark (whose cost equals 0.24 if
provided for nine generations).
Even though capital subsidies alone cannot take the economy to BGP , they can improve
the effectiveness of health subsidies. This is true, again, provided that xsub is sufficiently large.
For the benchmark parameterization in particular, xsub needs to be at least 0.11 (3.6% of GDP at
PT ). In Figure 4, if instead of allocating 0.22 units of international aid only to health prevention,
we choose (xsub ,ksub) = (0.15,0.07), the required number of subsidized generations falls to 5.
If we double the total subsidy and allocate it equally to capital and health investment so that
(xsub ,ksub)= (0.22,0.22), the number of generations declines from 3 to 2. But this type of com-
plementarity between capital accumulation and health aid becomes weaker as xsub becomes
smaller. For example, policy packages (xsub ,ksub) = (0.8,0) and (xsub ,ksub) = (0.7,0.1) need to
be applied only for one generation, but the package (xsub ,ksub) = (0.6,0.2) has to be provided
for at least 2 generations.
4.1.2 Convergence without a trap
Suppose a = 0.49. As we saw above, there is only one attractor, the BGP with high growth and
good health. Suppose also that economic development starts from K0 = 0.09 and i0 = 0.96.
Aggregate capital stock of 0.09 corresponds to PT in Figure 4, and a prevalence rate of 0.96 is
the maximum that the economy can endogenously reach for a = 0.49.
Figure 5 presents time paths of the growth rate for different policy packages implemented
every period. The comparison line i0 = 0 represents the disease-free scenario. The figure is
indicative of the substantial the cost of diseases and ill health. If the economy does not receive
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international aid, growth-rate convergence takes several centuries. This case is labeled the “no
subsidies” time path. Growth rates are close to zero during the first 3 generations and do not
reach half of that for the i0 = 0 case until the fifth generation. Indeed, growth even becomes
negative when the economy starts investing in prevention with generation 3 when the disease
externality is low enough to make this worthwhile. The cumulative cost of infectious disease in
terms of lost economic growth can, therefore, be large even though the economy converges to
the BGP in the long run.
Another result that comes out of Figure 5 is that policy packages that foster capital ac-
cumulation are now, not surprisingly, always more effective in raising growth. The package
(xsub ,ksub) = (0,0.22) takes the economy’s growth closer to the i0 = 0 path rather than the al-
ternatives (0.11,0.11) or (0.22,0). Nevertheless, subsidizing capital alone may not be socially
desirable if we take into account life expectancy. A package that includes xsub will decrease the
population of infected people and contemporaneously increase life expectancy. In contrast, a
package that only subsidizes capital accumulation does not impact the current generation. For
example, the policy package (0,0.22) leaves LE of the first generation unchanged at 50 years
while the package (0.22,0) raises their LE to 60 years, a substantial improvement (Figure 6).
Hence, a social planner who values longevity across generations may prefer an intermediate
policy that includes both types of subsidies.
4.1.3 Multiple balanced-growth paths
Compared to the benchmark case, ourmain results regarding policy effectiveness donot change
when there are multiple BGPs: capital subsidies alone cannot help an economy overcome the
low-growth trap, disease eradication is themost efficient intervention, and amixed policy pack-
age (xsub ,ksub)> 0 is preferred when eradication is not feasible. But there are a few differences.
Themain one is that escaping underdevelopment is now cheaper and faster. Another difference
is that capital subsidies are less able to compensate for the lack of health investment.
These differences are illustrated in Figure 7 which plots output growth rates (per genera-
tion) over ten generations. The starting point in each simulation is again the capital stock and
incidence rate in the benchmark-case PT . Each line is labeled appropriately; some of them
correspond to a value of φ of 0.47 (the benchmark), others to φ= 0.73 (with two BGPs).
Consider first results with (xsub ,ksub)= (0,0.22). For both values of the survival rate, growth
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falls and later rises towards its long-run value. However, growth rates are always higher and
theminimum is reachedmuch earlier whenφ= 0.73 than forφ= 0.47. In addition, the package
needs to be applied for 4 generations in the former case, compared to 9 generations in the latter.
This more rapid escape is due to faster capital accumulation.
The figure also shows that the package (xsub ,ksub) = (0.15,0.07) which is able to take the
economy out of the trap when φ= 0.47 cannot do so for φ= 0.73. This is true regardless of the
duration of the aid. Put differently, capital accumulation has less of a capacity to compensate
for the lack of health investment in this case.
4.2 Shocks
We conclude our analysis by considering the effect of health technology, institutions and polit-
ical conflict.
Start with medical innovations. Exogenous health improvements can occur through reduc-
tions in q and/or a. Any improvement in the health technology that diminishes the transmis-
sion of infectious disease raises growth and the effectiveness of policy. This is evident from the
no subsidies trajectory in Figure 5. Suppose that an economy located at the benchmark-case PT
sees a large-scale eradication of disease vectors that cause a to fall from 1 to say 0.49. This ef-
fectively makes income less relevant for disease transmission. Our previous analysis has shown
that this will trigger a long-run growth take-off. In Figure 5, this take-off is preceded by a slow-
down lasting several generations which occurs because the lower value of a initially creates
stronger incentives for health investment that dominate other types of (growth augmenting)
investment.
Medical innovation can obviously reducemortality andmorbidity. Figure 8 shows the effect
of this for economies that start from the poverty trap PT . The first set of exercises examine how
the ability of the economy to escape the trap changes with disease costs. A lower mortality risk
(lower φ in Figure 8) clearly reduces the costs and makes international aid more effective. In
particular, when we increase the survival rate from 47 to 57 percent, GDP growth increases sub-
stantially for all generations: compare the trajectory “xsup = 0.22, benchmark” to the trajectory
“xsup = 0.22, φ = 0.57”. Changes in morbidity parameters have the opposite effect. A higher θ
or a lower δ elicits a weaker preventive behavior which diminishes the impact of a given policy
package. This is illustrated in Figure 8 with a reduction in θ. When the productivity loss due to
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infection is only 5%, a health subsidy of 0.22 applied during 9 generations can no longer free
the economy from the trap (see trajectory “xsup = 0.22, θ = 0.05”).
It is also instructive to see what effects changes in institutional factors that raise aggregate
productivity, that is, higher A, have. Like the survival probability, A directly affects long-run
growth. But changes in A have a modest impact on a developing nation’s long-run growth and
health. Suppose that initially, φ = 0.72 and A = 19. The latter implies an annual steady-state
growth rate of 1 percent in a zero prevalence economy instead of the benchmark 1.8 percent. In
this case, thePT coordinates are (k, i )= (0.6,1). In addition, suppose that improvement in insti-
tutions protecting property rights and enforcing contracts raises A to 24.19.3 An economy that
was previously located in the poverty trap would now experience a relatively modest increase
in long-run growth from zero to 0.2 percent and no change in its population’s health.4
Finally, political factors also influence national health beyond their role in molding eco-
nomic andhealth institutions. Consider a simple example. García-Montalvo andReynal-Querol
(2007) find that, on average, 13 percent of the cases of malaria reported by theWorld Health Or-
ganization are caused by forcedmigration due to civil wars. The growth loss of starting develop-
ment with a prevalence rate of 13 percent versus zero is substantial. Comparing the trajectories
“i0 = 0” and “i0 = 0.13” in Figure 8, we see that the latter involves slower growth that, at least for
the first 3 generations, is less than half that for the disease-free economy.
5 Conclusions
We have presented an analysis of whether policy can accelerate growth and eliminate the bur-
den of ill health in the developingworld. Using the general equilibrium links between infectious
disease transmission and economic growth presented in Chakraborty, Papageorgiou and Perez-
Sebastian (2010), we have shown that untied income-based aid cannot deliver growth while aid
directed specifically towards health improvements can. In other words, when infectious dis-
eases significantly contribute to underdevelopment, successful policy interventions have to be
health specific, for instance in the form of vaccination or nutritional supplements.
3It makes sense to assume that its benchmark value (24.19) is the maximum value that A can take. The reason
is that A also affects economies that move along the high-growth BGP and are, therefore, on the technology and
institutional frontier.
4This exercise, of course, uncouples institutional improvements that increase A from improvements in public
health systems that lower q .
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The implications of this paper echo the recommendations of RachelGlennerster andMichael
Kremer on vaccine research (2000). For example, Kremer (2002), andmore recently Glennerster
et al. (2006) and Berndt et al. (2007), propose incentives for “... private sector R&D investments
in products for diseases concentrated in poor countries”. In our model, health aid in the form
of effective vaccination or drugs that can cure major diseases like malaria and tuberculosis is
one way, but not the only one, out of the low-growth poverty trap. Our experiments also re-
veal that while general institutional improvements have limited impact, institutional changes
that improve the quality of the health sector (public and/or private) are instrumental in raising
aggregate productivity.
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